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:DUIRUWKH5HWDNLQJRI&KLQD
,VDEHOOH&+(1*
Abstract: This article examines the role assigned to citizens by the 
ideology of authoritarianism in the relationship between Chiang Kai-
shek’s war to retake mainland China and the wartime regime con-
structed for fighting that war. Viewing Chiang’s ambition of retaking 
China by force as an anti-communist nationalist war, this paper 
considers this prolonged civil war as Chiang’s attempt at restoring the 
impaired sovereignty of the Republic of China. Adopting the concept 
of “necropolitics,” this paper argues that what underlay the planning 
for war was the manipulation of the life and death of the citizenry 
and a distinction drawn between the Chinese nation to be saved and 
the condemned communist Other. This manipulation and demarca-
tion was institutionally enforced by an authoritarian government that 
violated citizens’ human rights for the sake of winning the nationalist 
war. 
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&LWL]HQVLQWKH7RWDO:DU3URVHFXWHGE\
$XWKRULWDULDQLVP
How should we understand the relationship between Chiang Kai-
shek’s (Jiang Jieshi) declaration of war against the Chinese Com-
munist Party (CCP) and the wartime regime built by his authoritarian 
government for fighting this war? The war against the CCP was an-
nounced to the Chinese nation in Taiwan as a “total war,” and to the 
armed forces as a “revolutionary war” – with a strong emphasis on 
political and psychological means. The demand for the citizenry’s 
unreserved commitment to sacrifice, and the priority given to the 
spiritual and ideological uniformity of the armed forces, raise the 
fundamental question of how the citizenry was utilised by the gov-
ernment for this military offensive, which was envisaged as being 
conducted on a massive scale. 
In this context, this paper seeks to understand how authoritar-
ianism in its prosecution of wars militarises the citizenry and utilises 
its constituents as material fighting resources. Maintaining a standing 
force by conscription or recruitment defines the modern nation state. 
It requires a sovereign decision to determine who is drafted to fight 
against a selected enemy, internally or externally, and who must thus 
endure the consequences of fighting – including death.  
In this light, this paper proposes that “necropolitics” (Mbembé 
2003) is an appropriate analytical concept for understanding the role 
of the citizen in an armed conflict conducted by an oppressive re-
gime. Vested in sovereignty, necropolitics is the exercise of political 
authority by government agencies or via public policies that (pre)-
determines life and death among the citizenry in order to serve the 
interests of the state. While necropolitics is, by definition, embedded 
in the sovereignty of the nation state, it was particularly embraced by 
the authoritarian government of Taiwan at the peak of the Cold War 
in service of the government’s determination to resume the previous-
ly lost civil war against the CCP. Demanding the participation of the 
entire nation, this war was morally justified as the means to obliterate 
the non-constitutional CCP insurgency and restore the damaged sov-
ereignty of the Republic of China (ROC) in mainland China. In this 
war, the citizenry was essentialised as a military instrument for 
fighting the war as well as being emotively mobilised to conform to 
the prevailing state ideology. They were required to unreservedly 
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dedicate their lives, allegiance, and material resources to accomplish-
ing the goals pursued by the authoritarian government. 
To delineate how necropolitics is embedded within the authori-
tarian government’s war plans, this article will first review the current 
literatures on the studying of war plans of retaking China and focus-
ing on authoritarianism in regard to the party-state, democratisation, 
and transitional justice. Arguing that these bodies of work are insuffi-
ciently able to help us to grasp the reciprocal support between polit-
ical oppression and military ambition, this article will elaborate the 
concept of necropolitics and outline its embeddedness in sovereignty – 
for the purpose of exploring how the authoritarian government in 
Taiwan was able to prepare for a war to retake China during the 
1950s and 1960s. With the analytical concept explained, the article 
will then discuss the formation of the wartime regime – including the 
adoption of the National Mobilisation Plan and the development of 
Project Guoguang (഻ݹ䀸⮛, guoguang jihua), the most elaborate of 
the war plans overseen by Chiang Kai-shek and being a series of mili-
tary reforms indispensible for war preparations.  
In this context, this article will focus on certain incidents that 
underline the intentions behind and limitations of necropolitics. Ex-
amples are Chiang’s speech delivered to visiting overseas Chinese 
delegates as well as his decisions over drafting native Taiwanese sol-
diers to the standing force and, particularly, deploying them to the 
front line. Arguing that necropolitics is most evident in the meticu-
lous planning of Project Guoguang, this article will move on to then 
analyse how the Project’s staff assessed the insurmountable obstacles 
that caused the war plans to finally be shelved. To emphasise how 
necropolitics at this scale could not be institutionalised without the 
collaboration of political oppression, the final section of this article 
will analyse how martial law made the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, 
KMT, Guomindang) a fearsome authoritarian regime that “othered” 
citizens as communist sympathisers and, in some cases, deprived 
them of their lives without even sending them to the battlefield. The 
above analyses benefit from the use of a wide range of archival 
sources, including both unpublished ones and those published by the 
government – in addition to published memoirs, diaries, biographical 
essays, and oral history transcripts.  
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Before Chiang Kai-shek’s diaries and key governmental archives were 
made publicly available, it was generally agreed that Chiang’s deter-
mination to retake China was a disguise for propaganda at best or 
justification for authoritarianism at worst (e.g. Rawnsley 1999; Yang 
Huei-pang 2014). Commentaries during the 1960s positively evaluat-
ed the ROC military’s ability to withstand an invasion by the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA), but dismissed the former’s capability of initi-
ating an all-out campaign against the PLA (Kallgren 1963; Karnow 
1963). Overall, Chiang’s claimed determination to launch the war has 
been portrayed as an example of the dictator’s military brinkmanship 
and political expediency, as the government’s appropriation of a con-
tainment strategy for survival within the global situation of bipolar 
antagonism, and as a manifestation of an anti-communist nationalism 
imbued with geopolitical interests (Tsang 1993; Chang Su-ya 2001, 
2003, 2016; Lin Cheng-yi 2012, 2016). 
However, a reading of  Chiang’s diaries suggests that for him re-
covering mainland China was to fulfil his moral obligation of over-
turning Soviet imperialism (Chang Su-ya 2011; Yeh 2016). The open-
ing of  the archives of  Project Guoguang (഻ݹ䀸⮛, guoguang jihua) 
proves that from 1961 to 1972, Chiang personally oversaw the draft-
ing and drilling of  a large-scale military plan for attacking China 
(MND 2005a). What is also being proved is that prior to Project 
Guoguang, there had already been a series of  war plans developed by 
the military (MND 2005a; Chou and Chen 2014; Yeh 2016). This 
revelation has enabled military and diplomatic historians to uncover 
the geopolitical intrigue in Taiwan (among the civilian and military-
security elites) and in the United States (between the White House, 
State Department, Pentagon, Capitol Hill, Central Intelligence Agen-
cy, and the US Pacific Command). The orchestration of these war 
plans has been mostly depicted by historians as a concerted rational 
and lineal exercise of charting security parameters, assessing geopolit-
ical interests, extracting material resources, and measuring military 
capabilities (Lin Hsiao-ting 2011, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016; Chen 2012, 
2013, 2014b, 2015a, 2015b; Kung 2007; Yang 2013).  
Drawn to the details of  diplomatic negotiations and military ap-
praisals, these historical studies conceived the conscripting and arm-
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ing of  a standing force as part of  Taiwan’s overall military build-up. 
As such, they treated the existence of  the authoritarian government 
and the composition of  the armed forces as an empirical given. They 
did not question why and how citizens were utilised as fighting bodies 
by a government in exile that did not have unchallenged control over 
the population under its jurisdiction. Overlooking the political backup 
rendered by authoritarianism to military expansion, they missed an 
opportunity to scrutinise whether the proposed military campaigns 
enjoyed unequivocal support within the authoritarian government. 
Insensitivity to the political terrain lying underneath the diplomatic 
and military manoeuvring leaves a critical question unanswered; that 
is, how authoritarianism seizes the authority of  sovereignty, circum-
scribes the constitution, and deploys citizens as military and political 
resources on the battlefield – as well as on the home front, too. 
When the focus does turn to political oppression, it is obvious 
that scholarship on authoritarianism tends to downplay the “realness” 
of  the war. Because the field is dominated by political scientists, au-
thoritarianism is mostly conceptualised as a political system rather 
than as a “deformed” constitutional order. As a prototype of  the 
party-state, authoritarianism tends to be studied in terms of  how the 
state apparatus is overshadowed by party departments and public 
sector personnel infiltrated by party cells; thereby, the analytical unit is 
the political party, measured by power, rather than the institution, 
measured by legality.  
As such, the focus is on how the KMT monopolised power away 
from the state. To measure the level of  power concentration, such 
scholarship aimed at empirically proving that the KMT not only 
usurped power but also penetrated the government, military, and 
indeed all sectors of  society. For example, Winckler (1981) argued 
that the KMT was a Leninist party, in that it controlled a police state 
dominated by military interests – and that it was an unusual regime 
that absorbed the interests of  security, economics, and ideology. 
Dickson (1993) drew attention to the party’s reform of  the Central 
Committee between 1950 and 1952, arguing that this led to the estab-
lishment of  party cells throughout the government, military, and 
society (see also, Kung 1998). The analysis of  Myers (2009) was that 
the KMT’s reform in the early 1950s laid the foundation for an au-
thoritarian party-state, not only by recruiting native Taiwanese mem-
bers but also by winning local-level elections (see also, Wu 1987; Jen 
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2011). Another strand of  scholarship focuses on the KMT’s fettering 
of  education (Liu 2012), by such means as dispatching military in-
structors to high schools and universities (Lee 2011), and on the es-
tablishing of  the Chinese Anti-Communist National Salvation Youth 
Corps (ѝ഻䶂ᒤ৽ޡᮁ഻ൈ , Zhongguo qingnian fangong jiuguotuan) 
(Brindley 1999; Lee 2014). That happened in spite of  it causing a 
widespread outcry, such as in the articles published by the liberal 
magazine Free China (㠚⭡ѝ഻, ziyou Zhongguo) (Chang Shu-mei 2016). 
Beginning in the mid-1980s, research into authoritarianism in 
Taiwan gradually moved away from the KMT’s hallmarks as a Lenin-
ist party to its transformation. As part of  the so-called third wave of  
democratisation (Huntington 1991), it was argued that the KMT in 
the 1990s became the only Leninist party – one that remained in 
power by winning competitive elections (Winckler 1984; Dickson 
1993; Tsang 1999). This focus on the KMT’s democratisation has 
been followed by more recent examination of  the origins and pat-
terns of  violence endorsed by the coercive state apparatus (Greitens 
2013: 64–134) and the debate on transitional justice, as partly shown 
in the controversy over removing references to Chiang from public 
spaces (Taylor 2010; Taylor and Huang 2012). Detailing cases of  the 
“White Terror,” these studies revealed the degree of  suspension of  
citizenship and the violation of  human rights as a result of  political 
purges persecuted in the name of  national security, political stability, 
anti-communism, treason, or preventing subversion.  
Shifting the analytical unit from the party to state institutions and 
measuring legality, these studies challenged the legitimacy and consti-
tutionality of  numerous “special” laws and decrees that disrupted the 
implementation of  the ROC Constitution and conferred on the execu-
tive branch of  the government excessive authority and power (Chen 
2016; Su 2008; Yang Hsiu-chin 2014). They disregarded the govern-
ment’s propensity for plunging the nation living on the island into the 
war against the CCP on the mainland. They thus dismissed the gov-
ernment’s prioritisation of  selflessness, sacrifice, nationalism, patriot-
ism, and collectivism as warmongering for political gain. Therefore, 
although foregrounding the government’s abuses as justified by war-
time necessity, they overlooked how the citizenry was essentialised by 
the authoritarian government as a fighting body, and how this imper-
sonal militarisation was factored into the rational, practical, and tech-
nical calculations of  human resources for war preparations. 
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The above review suggests that it is critical to centralise the con-
ceptual and empirical correlation between war and authoritarianism in 
the context of  the institutionalisation of  political oppression that was 
deemed necessary to realise war mobilisation. This is particularly so 
given that the authoritarian government was enmeshed in a sociopol-
itically volatile environment where conflicts were rife between the 
minority of  refugee mainlanders (ཆⴱӪ, waishengren) and the majori-
ty of  native Taiwanese (ᵜⴱӪ, benshengren). Being liberalists, dissi-
dents, reformists, or pursuers of  independence, elites and ordinary 
citizens alike among both groups opposed or criticised the party-state 
and orthodox Chinese nationalism on a variety of  grounds. In this 
light, the citizenry – particularly its internal strife – is at the centre of  
the mutually reinforcing constitution of  war and authoritarianism. To 
underline the role of  the citizenry, this paper applies the aforemen-
tioned concept of  necropolitics – the instrumentalisation of  the life 
and death of  the citizenry – to the analysis of  the war against the 
People Republic of  China (PRC) as pursued by the authoritarian 
government at the peak of  the Cold War. It is in light of  this institu-
tional insight that Chiang’s unshaken determination to eradicate the 
CCP and his government’s glorification of  citizens’ sacrifice for a 
nationalist cause can be understood as intrinsic to the authoritarian-
ism that operated in the name of  sovereignty. 
1HFURSROLWLFV7KH,QVWUXPHQWDOLVDWLRQRI/LIH
DQG'HDWKE\6RYHUHLJQW\
As mentioned above, annihilating the CCP by force was proclaimed 
by Chiang and his authoritarian government as the means to recover 
ROC sovereignty. Characterising this nationalist war as “revolution-
ary warfare” (e.g. OCAC 1967: 42; MND 2005a: 15), Chiang gave 
instructions that it could not be waged entirely by military operations 
but rather by a formula of “thirty per cent military means, seventy per 
cent political means” (й࠶䓽һ, г࠶᭯⋫, sanfen junshi, qifen zhengzhi) 
(Chen 2015a: 45). In its implementation, the “political means” – or 
the “intangible forces” – were a conglomeration of propaganda, in-
doctrination, and irregular warfare. In practice, it included publicising 
Taiwan’s prosperity (relative to China) (e.g. OCAC 1967: 9, 14) and 
uprisings in China (e.g. OCAC 1967: 18, 23, 24, 41), instigating defec-
tion and inciting insurrection in China (Lin 2015: 76–108), landing 
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special forces or guerrilla fighters to sabotage strategic infrastructure 
and collect intelligence in China’s coastal areas and southwest hinter-
lands (Schoenhals 2012; Wang et al. 1996; Chen 2013; Hsiao 2014; 
Yeh 2016), and instilling in the people of Taiwan as well as overseas 
Chinese the morality of saving the Chinese nation from the destruc-
tive communist ideology and Soviet Russia’s imperialist suppression 
(Chiang 1957). The stress on intangible forces indicated that Chiang 
was acutely, and rationally, aware of the inability of the ROC military 
to launch a war against the CCP independent of US support (e.g. 
OCAC 1967: 44–45). Thus, emotive politics in the form of extolling 
sacrifice for nationalism is indispensable to the rationality of military 
operations (e.g. Lai 2016: 43). It is this inherent link between human 
sacrifice and sovereignty that warrants the application of the concept 
of necropolitics to analysing the intricate relationship between 
Chiang’s nationalist war and the authoritarian government. 
Sovereignty is said to be the ultimate and inalienable authority 
within a defined territory. This territorialised authority confers legiti-
macy on a government for its monopoly on the means of violence in 
the form of penal punishment, when law and order is at risk, and 
recourse to war – when enmity arises (Mbembé 2003: 22). In both 
instances, the authority to deprive citizens of their lives can be justi-
fied, enhanced, or hastened as a matter of necessity. Mbembé empha-
sises the synergy between the sovereign mandate and the resultant 
appropriation of human lives. He proposes that “to exercise sover-
eignty is to exercise control over mortality and to define life as the 
deployment and manifestation of power.” (Mbembé 2003: 11–12). 
Necropolitics is thus defined as the sovereign power which “dictate[s] 
who may live and who must die” (Mbembé 2003: 11–12, italics added 
for emphasis). Mbembé stresses the irrationality of sovereignty, argu-
ing that it leads to the “generalised instrumentalisation of human 
existence and the destructions of human bodies and populations” 
(Mbembé 2003: 13–14). Therefore, citizens are appropriated as ob-
jects fit for serving specific interests defined and pursued by the state; 
their autonomy and rationality can be removed, restricted, or sus-
pended in the name of fighting a war declared by the sovereign power. 
However, sovereignty is, by definition, an institution of morality 
that ensures the survival of the state and of citizens. In a state of 
emergency, the necessity of removing the threat to the survival of the 
state and its citizens brings into being the antagonism between the 
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Self, constituted by the state and its citizens, and the Other, who 
poses a threat. Extrapolating from this insight, this paper proposes 
that when animosity arises from within, a certain category of people 
among citizens are singled out from the population and marginalised 
as the Other. Regardless of where the boundary between the Self and 
the Other is drawn internally among the citizenry or erected external-
ly between two warring states, sovereignty bestows on the govern-
ment the legitimacy to terminate the existence of the Other, which 
may be achieved by depriving them of their lives. More critically, the 
very act of “termination” or “deprivation” could not be undertaken 
were there not a group of citizens who are appropriated by the sover-
eign power as the instrument of killing.  
In other words, to maintain the continuation of the Self some 
citizens – particularly those within the military-security apparatus – 
due to their chosen profession or to an endowed responsibility by 
conscription are delegated to kill. When the eradication of the enemy 
requires the involvement of the entire citizenry – such as a total war, 
as defined by Chiang for fighting against the CCP – then total mobili-
sation is called for as part of the readiness for self-sacrifice. Thus, 
killing and saving are paradoxically ingrained in sovereignty; they 
become an impersonal exercise of power justifiably consuming hu-
man lives (Mbembé 2003: 17). Sovereignty is thus a morally ambigu-
ous institution that is committed to salvation while it also simultan-
eously condones killing; its instrumentalisation of the life and death 
of its own citizens belies the proclaimed morality of saving lives. 
Placing Chiang’s nationalist war in the context of this moral para-
dox, it becomes clear that the citizenry holds the key to the militarisa-
tion facilitated by authoritarianism that drove the people of the island 
to engage in destruction in the name of national salvation. The CCP, 
together with its fighting arm the PLA, was the condemned Other in 
the ROC’s constitutional order. The communist ideology was de-
nounced as alien to Chinese culture, and harmful for the Chinese 
nation’s political and socio-economic development. The PRC’s lean-
ing towards the Soviet Union allowed it to be accused of succumbing 
to an imperial power that had caused the nation’s suffering (e.g. 
Chiang 1950: 253). In opposition to the condemned CCP, the “com-
patriots” in mainland China were part of the national Self who had to 
be saved – by the use of force by citizens in Taiwan – from the 
communists’ oppression. Moreover, as shown below, citizens in Tai-
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wan were also internally divided into the opposing categories of Self 
and Other, the boundaries of which were drawn aribitarily by the 
authoritarian government in accordance with their perceived political 
orientations. Liberalists, anti-government dissenters, or independence 
supporters were denounced as communist sympathisers, thus being 
the condemned Other. The demarcation of this Self–Other boundary 
held the key to the authoritarian government’s pursuit of the nation-
alist war. 
With the analytical framework instated, the following pages will 
now investigate how necropolitics was embedded in the war prepara-
tions of the authoritarian government. The paper will first concen-
trate on “National Mobilisation” (഻ᇦ㑭अ଑, guojia zong dongyuan) in 
conjunction with two major conscription campaigns in 1954–1955. It 
will demonstrate how the government dealt with citizens’ fear, suffer-
ing, and with the casualties caused by the war. How these challenges 
arose and the ways in which they were dealt with will make visible the 
existence of necropolitics, and outline the boundary between the 
saved Self and the denounced Other. I will then move on to examine 
how Project Guoguang arose from the political and security envir-
onment within and surrounding Taiwan at the time, and how it 
planned military offensives against the CCP.  
The focus of this investigation is on the Project staff’s unmistak-
able understanding of insurmountable practical constraints and, po-
tentially, resultant massive casualties. The difficulties encountered by 
the Project’s staff will illuminate how the demarcation between the 
Self and the Other within the citizenry of  Taiwan was reified by the 
authoritarian government so as to quell dissent or resistance – which 
might have challenged the raison d'être of authoritarian rule. These 
investigations are built on the use of several key primary source mater-
ials, such as the minutes of the Military Meeting (䓽һᴳ䃷, junshi 
huitan), a top-secret weekly meeting chaired by Chiang, interview 
transcripts (MND 2005a, 2005b; IMH 1995), governmental archives 
(Chou 1997; Chou and Chen 2014; ROC General Consulate in 
Yokohama 1962; CIA 1965), a personal diary (Lai 2016), a memoir 
(Ke 2002), autobiographical essays (Huang 1997), a government pub-
lication (OCAC 1967), and a publication that was compiled by the 
Ministry of National Defence (MND) in 1987 and eventually declassi-
fied in 2012 (MND 1987). 
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'\LQJIRUD1DWLRQDOLVW0LVVLRQDQG/LYLQJXQGHU
DQ$XWKRULWDULDQ5HJLPH
7KH'HYHORSPHQWRID:DUWLPH5HJLPH
Necropolitics as the othering and destruction of the CCP character-
ises the ROC’s political development during and after the Chinese 
Civil War. Key legislation that underlay the institutionalisation of 
necropolitics in the mainland included the implementation of Nation-
al Mobilisation in 1947 and, in the following year, the promulgation 
of the Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of National 
Mobilisation for the Suppression of Communist Rebellion (अ଑ᡑҲ
ᱲᵏ㠘ᱲọⅮ, dongyuan kanluan shiqi linshi tiaokuan) (henceforth the 
Temporary Provisions) in mainland China. When law and order in 
Taiwan was threatened by the influx of refugees crossing the Taiwan 
Strait in the wake of the KMT’s defeat on the mainland, martial law 
was announced in 1949 and ratified in 1950 – during which time the 
island was proclaimed a war zone (MND 1987: 801). Together with 
martial law, National Mobilisation was put into effect in the 1950s. 
During the 1960s, the Temporary Provisions not only lifted the limit 
on presidential terms (Article 3) but also conferred on the president 
expedient power to adopt measures or establish organisations that 
might be deemed necessary for fighting the war (Articles 4 and 5). 
:DU3ODQVDQG0LOLWDU\5HIRUPLQWKH&KDQJLQJ6HFXULW\
(QYLURQPHQW
In parallel to the implementation of National Mobilisation in the mid-
1950s, a series of war plans were delineated. The military studied the 
feasibility of and challenges arising from different levels of hostility, 
including a surprise attack, limited engagement, a large-scale cam-
paign (Chen 2014b: 293–359), and a regional campaign launched 
from the Chinese–Burmese bordering area that was reinforced by 
parachuting in special forces (Yeh 2016).  Succeeding these earlier 
attempts, and established in 1961, Project Guoguang was the most 
comprehensive war plan to date, one that was staffed by elite officers 
on loan from the army, navy, and air force. Known as the Guoguang 
Operation Office (഻ݹ֌ᾝᇔ, guoguan zouyeshi), the staff were led by 
a lieutenant general and answered directly to Chiang Kai-shek (MND 
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2005a). Its planning demonstrated the scale of casualties, or the de-
gree of the manipulation of citizens’ lives and deaths, that was ration-
ally calculated by the wartime regime to accomplish the termination 
of the communist Other and the salvation of the Chinese compat-
riots on the mainland. 
While war plans were under consideration, the Anti-Communist 
Salvation Army (৽ޡᮁ഻䓽 , fangong jiuguo jun), an irregular force 
trained by the US Central Intelligence Agency and based on islands 
close to China, raided Chinese coastal areas in 1951–1954 (Holober 
1999). However, before the military could realistically contemplate a 
war, the armed forces had to undergo significant reform in order to 
improve their interservice operation, modernise their armaments, and 
enhance their ideological conformity. These goals were achieved in 
the 1950s. The number of army divisions was streamlined, and the 
remaining ones were restructured in order to reimpose Chiang’s un-
challenged control and clip the influence of the US-favoured George 
Li-jen Sun (Sun Liren) (Chen 2015b; Lin 2016; Yang 2011). Military 
officers, civil servants, and party cadres were selected to attend the 
Institute of Revolution and Practice (䶙ભሖ䑀⹄ウ䲒, gemin shijian 
yanjiuyuan) for unifying their political orientation (Lu 2003; Jen 2011).  
Forced through by Chiang Ching-kuo (Jiang Jingguo, a Soviet-
style political commissar system was imposed in 1950 despite re-
sistance among commanders on the basis of its interference with 
their authority as well as the criticism of it by the US (Chen 2014a; 
Bullard 1996: 80–100). Recruited in mainland China in 1948 and 
founded in 1949 in southern Taiwan (MND 2005b: 1), the Women’s 
Army Corps (ྣ䶂ᒤᐕ֌བྷ䲺 , nü qingnian gongzou dadui) was sent 
down and deployed among rank-and-file soldiers for political indoc-
trination, communication, recreation, as well as for teaching Manda-
rin (Hua 2000; MND 2005b: 7–8). Known as the White Group (ⲭൈ, 
baituan), former Japanese military personnel were not only entrusted 
by Chiang with training troops and elite officers (Chiang 1950: 255–
259; Lin 1996; Chen 2005; Lin 2013; Kushner 2013; Tsuyoshi 2015), 
but also with developing a war plan (Lin 2015: 121–122; Chou and 
Chen 2014: 346–604).  
In 1954, the ROC–US Mutual Defence Treaty was signed with-
out clarifying whether the security alliance applied to islands closer to 
China’s coast (Wang 2014; Lin Hsiao-ting 2016; Chang 1994, 2016). 
Earlier arms sales by the US were made possible via commercial 
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channels (Lin 2011), but their official transfer was later facilitated 
thanks to the Defence Treaty. The superpower’s training doctrines 
were implemented under the close watch of the US Military Assis-
tance Advisory Group (MAAG), who eventually succeeded in confin-
ing the influence of the shadowy White Group (Lin 2015: 120). In 
coordination with the US, the government evacuated troops and the 
civilian population from Dachen and Yijianshan to Taiwan in 1955 
(Military Meetings, 5, 12, 19 February 1955) and withstood the PLA’s 
intensive shelling of Jinmen in 1958 (Chang and He 1993). 
While these reforms gradually strengthened the ROC military in-
to a force capable of withstanding a PLA invasion, the strategic envir-
onment surrounding Taiwan in the 1950s and the early 1960s was 
rapidly evolving. Entangled with the unfolding Cold War in East 
Asia, Taiwan was unexpectedly protected by the neutralisation of the 
Taiwan Strait in the wake of the Korean War from 1950 onwards 
(Fellman 2012). The PLA’s participation in that war prompted 
Chiang to propose an attack on China by the ROC military, but his 
offer was turned down by the US (Yeh 2016: 152; Lin 2015: 122–
123). Later geopolitical parameters were positively assessed by the 
military for launching the war, such as the Sino–Soviet split under 
Nikita Khrushchev, the enhanced relationship between the USSR and 
North Korea, the USSR’s intervention in Laos, the CCP’s acquisition 
of nuclear capabilities (Lai 2016: 295–299, 302, 311), and the pro-
tracted US involvement in the Vietnam War (Lai 2016: 313, 357, 
359). Capitalising on anti-communist interests shared with South 
Vietnam, Chiang was enticed by the prospect of conducting guerrilla 
warfare in Vietnam and in the Thai–Burmese borderlands so as to 
support a surprise attack from Taiwan on China’s southeast coast 
(MND 2005a: 11, 264, 476; Huang 2013; Yeh 2016). 
 
6HOI9HUVXV2WKHULQWKH1DWLRQDO0RELOLVDWLRQDQG
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In the midst of these critical developments, in 1954 the conscription 
model originally inherited from the Japanese (Ke 2002: 98–99) was 
revamped, whereby the reserve system was established – therein 
learning from the both Japanese and US experiences (Military Meet-
ing, 9 April 1955). As a result, not only was the quality of the standing 
force improved but also the resupply of human resources from native 
  68 Isabelle Cheng 

Taiwanese males was institutionalised. In anticipation of the war, on 
25 November 1955 Chiang approved the National Mobilisation Plan 
(഻ᇦ㑭अ଑䀸⮛, guojia zong dongyuan jihua) that was drafted by the 
National Defence Council (NDC) (഻䱢ᴳ䆠, guofang huiyi). The fol-
lowing month, the NDC instructed the cabinet to muster all available 
civilian and military resources for war readiness (Chou 1997: 309–
388). To dissolve potential resistance among citizens to the war and 
strengthen their endurance (Chou 1997: 326), a Spiritual Mobilisation 
Plan (㋮⾎अ଑䀸⮛, jingshen dongyuan jihua) was prepared along with 
four other sub-plans for total mobilisation. Exclusively framed 
around the Otherness of the CCP, this ideological campaign aimed at 
supporting anti-communist patriotic literature, strengthening the 
national spirit, promoting social reforms centring on austerity, con-
ducting psychological warfare in China, anchoring public opinions, 
and censoring the press (Chou 1997: 324–325). Necropolitics, in the 
form of Chinese nationalism and sinicisation indoctrinating more the 
native Taiwanese population, was thus incorporated into the plans for 
national mobilisation. 
Necropolitics also featured in Chiang’s political communications, 
with his recognition of a necessary and inevitable sacrifice (see Lams 
and Lu in this issue, for their analysis of Chiang’s public speeches). 
Twenty days before Chiang approved the National Mobilisation Plan, 
on 5 November 1955, a reception hosted by he and Madame Chiang 
for the visiting overseas Chinese delegation was used to address the 
issue of war. He informed his audience of the increasing social unrest 
in China in the previous year, which, by his formula of revolutionary 
warfare, indicated that the time was ripe to strike. He asked his audi-
ence: “Under such circumstances, why has the government not 
launched the war?” (italics added for emphasis). Reciting the slogan 
of “prepare in the first year, attack in the second year, swift campaign 
in the third year, succeed in the fifth year” (аᒤⓆۉҼᒤ৽᭫й
ᒤᦳ㮙ӄᒤᡀ࣏ , yinian zhunbei, liangnian fangong, sannian saodang, 
wunian chenggong) that was first formulated by him in 1950 (Yeh 2016: 
149), he acknowledged that the delay had been caused by the fact that 
his military forces had lost air and sea supremacy to the PLA – which 
had benefitted from the transfer of weaponry from the Soviets 
(OCAC 1967: 42–45). Nevertheless, he reassured his audience that 
the government would endeavour to win a swift and decisive victory 
in between five and seven years so as to “reduce the pain and shorten 
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the duration of the war” for the nation in Taiwan, and equally im-
portantly, to spare their mainland compatriots from suffering devas-
tation in war (OCAC 1967: 42–43; emphasis added).  
Intending to arouse the nationalist sentiments of his overseas 
Chinese audience, Chiang’s rhetoric revealed how the boundaries 
between the Self and the Other were drawn and thus how life and 
death were predetermined in the exectution of this anti-communist 
war. That is, the war was justified not only on the grounds of restor-
ing the constitutional order but also of eradicating communist ideol-
ogy and saving compatriots from the totalitarian CCP regime. Ideo-
logically, these “twin” missions were indispensible from each other 
and imposing these both on the citizens in Taiwan was central to the 
process of indoctrination for both mainlanders and native Taiwanese – 
and for the sinicisation particularly of native Taiwanese. Instrumen-
talised for fulfilling these missions, the lives of citizens in Taiwan 
were demanded by the sovereignty for the purpose of killing the CCP 
and saving their mainland compatriots from the latter’s totalitarian 
regime.  
Necropolitics is further evident in the context of sinicisation, 
when the focus was on the potential casualties among Taiwanese 
soldiers. Known as “supplementary forces” (㼌ݵޥ , buchongbing), 
native Taiwanese were originally exempt from deployment to the 
islands, including Dachen and Yijianshan (Hu 1976: 22), which were 
severely attacked by the PLA. On 8 January 1955, at the Military 
Meeting and concerned about the impact on “the hearts and minds of 
(native) Taiwanese” (㠪⚓≁ᗳ, Taiwan minxin), Chiang criticised his 
subordinates over drafting native Taiwanese soliders to serve in the 
84th Division – who were stationed in Dachen. While not overruling 
the statutory duration of two years service, Chiang gave two remedial 
orders: (1) deployment to the islands should not last longer than six 
months; (2) units returning from the islands should be given one-
month leave (Military Meeting, 8 January 1955). Arguablly, his inten-
tion was to lessen the fear of death that had been simmering within 
the native population. In spite of sinicising native Taiwanese – includ-
ing them in the National Self (the Chinese nation), and instilling pat-
riotism in them – Chiang was shrewd about the implications of the 
failure of necropolitics, and did not harbour the illusion that he could 
demand their lives. 
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The implications of failing necropolitics continued to manifest 
via the micro-resistance among the native population after military 
forces and civilians were evacuated from Dachen to Taiwan. In the 
midst of a drafting drill, on 12 February 1955, at the Military Meeting 
the army commander reported that three Taiwanese conscripts in 
Tainan had cut off their right index fingers at home in the hope of 
evading conscription. The air force commander added that Taiwanese 
conscripts serving in Dachen were “much stricken by the fighting in 
Yijianshan” and that they were noted for being less disciplined than 
their mainland counterparts. Chiang then instructed the General Pol-
itical Warfare Department to organise a publicity campaign so as to 
sanitise the “rumours” that might have been circulated by the 500-
plus Taiwanese conscripts who had returned from the war zone (Mili-
tary Meeting, 12 February 1955). On 9 April, at the Military Meeting, 
Chiang was briefed on the proceedings of two drafting drills that set 
their target totals of conscripts at 42,340 and 27,217 men respectively. 
The number of men who cut off their index fingers increased to 11. 
Nevertheless, Taiwanese conscripts were said to be in high morale; a 
rapport was said to have been established between mainlander and 
Taiwanese servicemen (Military Meeting, 9 April 1955). Although the 
minutes of this meeting did not record Chiang’s comments, the brief-
ings made by his subordinates suggested that they had tuned in to the 
political sensitivity of necropolitics. 
3URMHFW*XRJXDQJDQG,WV3UDFWLFDO'LIILFXOWLHV
The sociopolitical turmoil in the aftermath of the “Great Leap For-
ward” in China was received by Chiang and the military as the signal 
for launching the war (MND 2005a: 15, 240, 354, 457; Wang 2006: 
174–175). Project Guoguang was thus established in April 1961, aim-
ing at launching a surprise attack on the coast of Fujian independent 
of US assistance – at least in the initial stages (MND 2005a: 14, 65). 
The ROC General Consulate in Yokohama (1962) reported that Ja-
pan had cautiously watched a series of telltale signs unfolding 
throughout the first half of 1962, such as: (1) in February and March, 
the Bureau of Military Administration in War Affected Zones (ᡠൠ
᭯उተ, zhandi zhengwu ju) (for its missions, see Bullard 1996: 105) and 
the Committee of Economic Mobilisation and Planning (㏃☏अ଑䀸
⮛င଑ᴳ, jingji dongyuan jihua weiyuanhui) were founded respectively 
within the MND and under the Executive Yuan; (2) in late March, 
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Chiang announced that the time was ripe to strike; and, (3) in April, 
the Special Defence Budget (഻䱢⢩ࡕ乀㇇, guofang tebei yusuan) was 
adopted, followed by the implementation of the Special Defence 
Levy (഻䱢⢩ࡕᦀ, guofang tebei juan) – the duration of which ran up to 
June of the following year. Japan was also reported by the Consulate 
to have noted the US’s open rejection of the use of force in East Asia 
(ROC General Consulate in Yokohama 1962: 1, 4). 
As explicitly understood by Project Guoguang staff, the key to 
initiating the war was to obtain US support; as such, three scenarios 
were considered favourable for initiating the strike. They were: (1) 
military conflicts erupting inside China, and the US agreeing to be 
involved; (2) fierce factional struggles breaking out within the CCP 
leadership, and the US agreeing to be involved; and, (3) military con-
flicts arising in the Chinese border areas as a result of “international 
interventions,” and the US agreeing to lend its support (MND 2005a: 
58). However, messages sent internationally by the US clearly nulli-
fied the realism of any of these scenarios. It was noted by one of the 
Project’s longest-serving staff members (Wang 2006: 201) that on 23 
June 1962 the US informed the PRC at the “Ambassadorial Talk” in 
Warsaw of its opposition to Chiang’s ambition, and that on 22 May 
1963 President Kennedy openly announced that Chiang should con-
sult with the US over his intended military actions against the CCP 
(MND 2005a: 194).  
The US’s objection was also unmistakably demonstrated in Tai-
wan by the MAAG’s aggressive intelligence-gathering about Chiang’s 
steadfast preparations for war (MND 2005a: 193–194). A tactic con-
sidered to create a fait accompli that could justify the ROC’s assault 
and, hopefully, secure subsequent US support, was to parachute spe-
cial forces into China so as to instigate local uprisings or even to oc-
cupy an area and “invite” the return of the KMT (MND 2005a: 193). 
However, no one – not even Chiang himself – could bank on the 
success of such infiltration (Lai 2016: 37) or on the presumed “em-
brace” by their mainland compatriots (MND 2005a: 193, 285). Such a 
lack of confidence highlights the cracks in necropolitics, since the 
boundaries between Self and Other were not as clear-cut as imagined. 
Therefore Project Guoguang’s meticulous planning could not move 
further than Phase I, of attacking and landing (MND 2005a: 30–31). 
In actuality, even the first stage of surprise attack proved too dif-
ficult to carry out. The Project’s staff were challenged by lingering 
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problems that had already been identified by an earlier war plan, 
overseen by Vice President Chen Cheng (MND 2005a: 54–58). Two 
crucial obstacles, among others, were the shortage of troops and the 
inadequate capacity for force projection. It was estimated that, partly 
to offset an expected casualty toll of 50,000 lives, a total of 270,000 
troops were required (MND 2005a: 53, 58). Jinmen would serve as a 
forward base for amphibious landings on Xiamen (MND 2005a: 56, 
196, 310, 326; Szonyi 2008), whereby the reinforcements would be 
delivered by military vessels as well as by civilian boats. The over-
loaded navy had to raise its sealift capacity by levying and refitting 
merchant fleets (MND 2005a: 56–57). If the initial landing was suc-
cessful, the ground forces would then meet the PLA’s counter-attack 
and the PLA’s reinforcements would arrive on D-5 Day, secured by 
the intensive PLA air strikes and denial of supplies to the ROC 
ground forces from the sea. A landing operation as such would in-
volve one-third of the total mobilised troops, a scale that would have 
been objected to by the US – if this reluctant ally had indeed been 
consulted prior to the operation. If the landing was successful, the 
supply of materials to the ground forces was a task that could not be 
easily accomplished without US assistance (MND 2005a: 57–58). 
Even if the mainlander military leadership’s dedication to the na-
tionalist cause was never in question (e.g. Lai 2016: 43, 52, 58, 63, 
147, 196, 198, 301, 311, 337, 353, 367, 382, 384, 385), their profes-
sionalism nevertheless cast doubts over actually surmounting these 
practical challenges. The navy was acutely aware that, with all of the 
transport crafts at its disposal, the service was still unable to deliver 
all the men and their arms to the battlefield. Refitting merchant fleets 
might increase the headcounts of sealift capacity. However, soldiers 
crammed into these overcrowded vessels would lose their fighting 
ability prior to landing (MND 2005a: 87, 208–213, 307–308, 310, 324, 
326, 379). The air force was also conscious of its insufficient capacity 
(Lai 2016: 23). Operating on an airlift capacity that was restricted by 
the US, the air force found it difficult to parachute troops from over-
loaded transport aircraft (MND 2005a: 214–215, 474). In essence, the 
difficulties envisaged by the staff manifested the constraint of necro-
politics; should the war be fought, it would lead to massive casualties – 
a political decision that can only be made by the sovereign power. 
Thus, although the war appeared imminent during 1961–1962, 
due to US opposition it was eventually put on hold (Wang 2006: 178–
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185, 200–202). D-Day was held back to the summer of 1965; precise-
ly, the critical decision of whether to go to war was to be made by 20 
July (Lai 2016: 416, 426). There was an intense atmosphere in which 
“everyone knows we’re about to strike” (MND 2005a: 282), and 
Chiang received some lower-ranking commanders whose units would 
be dispatched to the battlefield (MND 2005a: 206–207, 310–311, 379, 
458). A retired colonel recalled that officers of the mobilised units 
were ordered to submit their wills to their superiors (author’s private 
correspondence 2010; MND 2005a: 207). Being deployed to Jinmen 
in the 1960s, when the PLA blanketed the island with propaganda 
materials, also required the submission of will, as recalled by a retired 
officer of the Women’s Army Corps (Anonymous 1 2017). Death as 
a consequence of war would not be a remote prospect for the mobil-
ised troops. 
However, as known to the world, D-Day was never ultimately 
announced; the war was never launched. Project Guoguang was 
shelved in 1972, not long after the ROC was ousted from the United 
Nations. If, as discussed above, the resistance of less than a dozen 
Taiwanese conscripts was considered by Chiang as a sign of social 
instability, then the political consequences of mobilising a total of 
730,000 men between the ages of 21 and 35 – as proposed by the 
National Mobilisation Plan in March 1956 (Chou 1997: 351) – would 
have been unthinkable (MND 2005a: 311). The US pointed out the 
possibility of subversion in Taiwan should the latter attack China 
(CIA 1965). Therefore, Chiang and his government could not be 
naïve about the political risk of sending a considerable number of 
Taiwanese males to war against the CCP. The task of ameliorating the 
impact of necropolitics was left to the Taiwan Garrison High Com-
mand (㠪⚓䆖ۉ㑭ਨԔ䜘, Taiwan jinbai zong silingbu) (henceforth, the 
Command) to ensure political stability. 
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The Command was a fearsome organisation, one that encompassed 
the missions of preventing communist penetration, ensuring public 
security, organising civil defence, and implementing national mobili-
sation (MND 1987: 774, 797–800; Fravel 2002). The Command grew 
to become an iron fist of authoritarianism, largely owing to the man-
date of martial law. Under this, Taiwan was divided into four regions 
and 18 subregions. To put down any unrest and subversion breaking 
  74 Isabelle Cheng 

out in Taiwan, regional commanders could coordinate the military 
police, the police force, and intelligence services besides their own 
forces – and, if necessary, army troops too (MND 1987: 803–804). 
The mandate of preventing penetration was conveniently used for 
suppressing the Taiwan independence movement, whose proponents 
were labelled as being CCP collaborators. Citizens’ demands for dem-
ocracy, freedom, and human rights were denounced as subversion 
assisted by “external forces” (MND 1987: 808–809). Labelled as 
communist sympathisers, independence supporters, liberalists, dissi-
dents, and reformists, these individuals were criminalised by their 
political orientations and excluded from the national Self to be part of 
the condemned Other. Thrown into the opposing category, they were 
denounced as “the enemy within.” 
It is obvious that, in the eyes of the authoritarian government, 
Taiwan could not be an anti-communist bastion fit for war if the 
hearts and minds of the citizenry did not conform to the former’s 
anti-communist Chinese nationalism. Should the spiritual mobilisa-
tion campaign mentioned above fail to unify the citizenry, the Com-
mand’s expedient power to screen private thoughts was entrusted to 
carry out necropolitics by punishing those who deviated from the 
orthodox stance. Under the decrees issued by the Command (MND 
1987: 829–830), ones consolidated in 1952, it conducted a “special 
inspection” (⢩⃒, tejian) to censor publications and intercept mail for 
the purposes of counter-intelligence, counter-penetration, counter-
sabotage, counter-united front, crime prevention, intelligence collec-
tion, and supporting clandestine operations in China. The intrusion 
into citizens’ private correspondence went hand in hand with the 
monitoring of what they read and wrote privately in diaries or letters, 
and what they disseminated and published in public. Censorship sup-
ported the wartime regime by outlawing private thoughts and public 
information that was regarded as violating the fundamental policy of 
anti-communism, as damaging national security and public order, as 
opposing traditional Chinese culture, or, ironically, as damaging dem-
ocracy and liberty (MND 1987: 840) (for censorship implemented in 
1945–1949, see Dluhošová in this topical issue). 
Therefore, the anti-communist campaign served a fundamental 
function – to distinguish the Self from the Other among citizens. 
This was effectively enforced by political purges or the military trials 
of liberalists and political dissidents (e.g. Su 2008; Yang Hsiu-chin 
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2014; Chen 2016), or by ordinary citizens being interned because of 
fabricated allegations (e.g. Ke 2002: 98–127). Exercised by a variety 
of military agencies, violence in the name of anti-communism was 
inflicted upon members and trainees of the Women’s Army Corps – 
who were interned without trial (MND 2005b: 19, IMH 1995: 57–59, 
79–83, 214–217, 240–241, 262–266, 363–365). Their alleged offences 
included “denouncing” the government in their diaries, befriending a 
CCP agent, establishing “secret organisations” in light of their inad-
vertent forming of a small friendship circle and collecting friends’ 
photos, and being “communist sympathisers” because of their inter-
est in Chinese or Russian leftist novels (Hua 2000: 80–85; MND 
2005b: 20). A cook for the Women’s Army Corps was tortured to 
death after being forced to confess to the charge fabricated against 
him that the food poisoning caused by his cooking was a communist 
plot (Hua 2000: 179–200).  
These cases illuminate the arbitrariness of the exclusion of citi-
zens, be they native Taiwanese or mainlanders, who were labelled as 
communist sympathisers – and who, as such, were separated from 
the national Self and endured the irreversible consequences (death or 
long-term imprisonment) of being condemned as the Other. A 
chilling message sent by these purges is that, under necropolitics, 
citizens – including those who had committed themselves to the na-
tionalist cause – could lose their lives to their repressive government 
even without ever setting foot on the battlefield. Enduring the trauma 
and suffering the consequences (e.g. IMH 1995: 59–62), their families 
were also othered and became the “walking dead”1 – whose liveli-
hoods and well-being became part of the sacrifice demanded by the 
anti-communist ideology. 
&RQFOXVLRQ
Focusing on the politicisation of the citizenry, this study contributes 
to our understanding of the symbiosis between Chiang Kai-shek’s 
war against the CCP and the authoritarian government built during 
the 1950s and 1960s for fighting this war. Resorting to an emotive 
nationalist appeal of dispelling Soviet imperialism and eradicating the 

1 The author thanks one anonymous reviewer for suggesting the concept of 
“walking dead.” 
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alien communist ideology, Chiang’s persistence in regarding the CCP 
insurgency as unlawfully occupying ROC territory made the national-
ist war also a prolonged civil war for recovering ROC sovereignty. 
Thus the operation of  authoritarianism was deeply entwined with the 
military build-up occurring as part of  the promised war to retake 
mainland China. Arguing that citizens’ lives and deaths do not feature 
significantly in the existing literature regarding the mutually reinforc-
ing constitution of  the nationalist war and political repression, this 
study adopted the analytical concept of  necropolitics for its insights 
into how citizens are essentialised as military resources and indoctri-
nated by authoritarianism to become selfless nationalist soldiers. 
Underlining the cleavages between mainlanders and native Tai-
wanese within the citizenry, it was found that the indoctrination of  
Chinese nationalism – in tandem with terror – could not unify the 
two groups in the face of  war. Rather, as understood by Chiang and 
his military aides, the anticipated war casualties could in fact deepen 
the existing cleavages. The futility of  Project Guoguang shows that 
the war against the CCP would be, in essence, collective suicide, due 
to the unlikelihood of  overcoming the practical obstacles faced and 
of  securing US support. The fear of  the prospect of  death – the core 
challenge to necropolitics – could not be quelled without the terror 
of  the wartime regime, as mandated by the sovereign power. 
This paper further found that necropolitics was also embedded 
in the Othering of citizens according to their political orientations. 
Those who were included in the category of Self by the authoritarian 
government were “compatriots” in mainland China and citizens in 
Taiwan who did not question the legitimacy of anti-communist na-
tionalism. Those who were consigned to the category of Other were 
the CCP, the PLA, and the denounced CCP sympathisers – liberal-
ists, dissidents, and proponents of independence persecuted for their 
political beliefs and acts, as well as ordinary citizens who lost their 
freedom or even their lives to fabricated accusations. Abusing its 
expedient power to Other citizens, the government deprived some of 
their lives without even sending them to the battlefield. These critical 
findings offer fresh insights into our understanding of the founding, 
implementation, and impact of war-fighting authoritarianism, as an 
ailing exercise of sovereignty. 
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